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With the appointment of James Watt as Secretary of Interior, the
continuing debate between environmentalists and industry over access
to federal lands for oil and gas development has become strident. The
author of this article presents an industry viewpoint of intergovernmental restraints on oil and gas development, beginning with what
he perceives as the extremely restrictive policies of the past and continuing with more recent developments under Secretary Watt. The
article especially emphasizes how these intergovernmental restraints
are affecting the development of the Overthrust Belt of Wyoming,
Utah, Montana, and Idaho.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS
ON OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENTS
Ruland J. Gill, Jr.**
INTRODUCTION

1

The Overthrust Belt of Utah, Wyoming, Montana and
Idaho is regarded by both energy industry and federal
government leaders as an important part of the total energy
potential of the Western states. As the uncertainties of
volatile governments in oil exporting countries continue,
the oil and gas in the Overthrust Belt will play an increasingly important part in fulfilling domestic energy requirements.
*This article is an updated reprint of a paper presented at a Special Institute on The Overthrust Belt-Oil and Gas Legal and Land Issues, sponsored
by the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, November 20-21, 1980,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
**Staff Attorney, Wexpro Co., The Oil and Gas Exploration and Production
Subsidiary of Mountain Fuel Supply Co., Salt Lake City, Utah; J.D., University of Utah College of Law, 1973; admitted, Utah State Bar, 1973.
J. Barry,
1. Grateful appreciation is extended to Michael D. White and Hamlet
III for granting permission to use a condensed portion, in Part I infra,
of their excellent article, Energy Development in the West: Conflict and
Coordinationof Governmental Decision-Making, 52 N.D.L. REv. 451 (Spring
1976).
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A continuing debate is now being carried on throughout the capitol buildings of the Western states and the
nation's capital as to which is the proper party to superintend energy development in the West, as to who will make
tough future decisions concerning tradeoffs between the
practical and economic effects of full energy development
and the protection of the environment, and whether the
states will have any voice in the arena of Western energy
development.
The United States is heavily dependent on oil and gas
to meet its energy needs. We have been continually faced
with declines in the domestic supply of oil and gas 2 from
the 1970 peak. In order to supplement stagnating domestic
production of fuels, increasing quantities of crude oil and
refined petroleum have been imported from outside countries in recent years. However, as the 1973 OPEC Middle
East embargo demonstrated, the United States cannot permit itself to rely upon foreign sources for its energy requirements as such dependence threatens our national as well as
economic security.
Increased domestic energy production will be necessary
to satisfy the projected doubling of our energy consumption8 by the year 2000. While using a number of assumptions concerning federal energy policy, the Department of
Interior has concluded that such increased energy production is feasible. Two of these assumptions are that (1)
energy resource availability will be enhanced by the federal
government's leasing of federal lands, and (2) environmental
protection laws will not be so onerous as to frustrate this
development policy.4
As the focus of national attention for oil and gas has
turned inward toward the Overthrust Belt and other promising areas, there has developed an increasing state concern
about the impact of energy development upon the interests
2. See generally, PROJECT INDEPENDENCE REPORT, Federal Energy Administration (November 1974).
3. See, Dupree & Corsentino, UNITED STATES ENERGY THROUGH THE YEAR

2000 (Revised), Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Dept. of Interior (1975).
4. Id. at 24.
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of such states. A tug-of-war between the states and the
federal government has begun over the extent of the state's
voice in Western energy development. In addition, as the
division between state and federal authority has become
obscured, coordination between the levels of government
has become an increasingly difficult problem. Ambiguity
and delays in energy policies and in important government
actions have resulted. The energy shortage is bringing into
sharp focus a potential conflict between those in favor of
rapid development of the oil and gas of the Overthrust Belt
and those in favor of preserving the area's environmental
quality.
At present, permanent solutions to these problems have
been attempted through federal legislation or through caseby-case litigation. Litigation, with all its uncertainties for
all parties, is both inordinately time consuming and enormously wasteful of human effort and money. The problems
are immediate and so are the needed solutions. Unfortunately, however, comprehensive remedial federal legislation
is not an immediate prospect.
The federal government will continue to preside as
the decision-maker of national interests, and it is probable
that future cooperative agreements and legislation will
leave to the federal sovereign many decisions as to where
and when energy development is going to occur. However,
if this federal power is used in unbridled unconcern for
state and local interests, unrest in the Western states will
surely continue. Therefore, state and local governments must
be given participation in and a voice over such decisions when
the development is so designed as to create substantial impacts on matters of state and local concern.
Changes in the relationship between the federal government and the states are occurring on a day-to-day basis even
as this article is being written. The cooperative policies of
President Reagan's administration and especially those of
Secretary of Interior James Watt have helped to soothe some
of the festering jurisdictional sores which occurred during
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prior administrations.' Even now the dynamic process of
governmental interaction could be solving or exacerbating
some, of the conflicts which have already arisen and are
discussed herein.
The general purpose of this presentation is to briefly
examine the authority among the various levels of federal,
state and local governments and to highlight apparent
practical and economic constraints on oil and gas development in the Overthrust Belt. Some of the problems presented
will not lend themselves to easy resolution short of legislation or constitutional revision. However, where solutions are
apparent, they will be addressed.
I.

SOURCES OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL POWERS

As a general overview, no matter what level of government seeks to directly or indirectly regulate or control land
use decisions, the regulation or means of control must be
based upon one or more of those powers which that level of
government may exercise.
The federal government may exercise only those powers
enumerated in the Constitution of the United States, and it
must act only within the areas of its stated authority.
However, broad U.S. Supreme Court holdings have supported the exercise of federal control and involvement in
land use decisions.
On the other hand, the powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor granted to the citizens of the nation, have been reserved to the states. The
states in turn, by state constitution or enabling legislation,
have delegated some of those retained powers to local levels
of government such as counties, cities and special districts.
5.

For example, see 46 Fed. Reg. 24135 (April 29, 1981),
changed a long standing policy which improves the state
process that will expedite the selection by the states
in lieu selection rights and which removes the 12,000

wherein the BLM
indemnity selection
of their remaining
acre limitation on

previous in lieu selections.
6.

It is stated that "[V]irtually any conceivable measure reasonably intended
to protect the environment can readily be sustained under one or more of
the grants of authority to Congress." Rosenthal, Federal Power to Preserve
the Environment: Enforcement and Control Techniques, in Environmental
Control: Priorities, Policies and the Law, 213, 219 (1971). See also E.
Dolgin and T. Gilbert, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 21-22 (1974).
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Having gained their powers from the state, the local levels
of government may not exceed the powers that have been
delegated to them by the state.
A. Federal Powers
1. Commerce Clause
The U.S. Constitution grants congress the power "to
regulate commerce .

.

.

among the states."7 Congress is

granted by the commerce clause the power to:
(a) prevent the misuse of channels of commerce,
(b) protect the instrumentalities of commerce,
and
(c) regulate
certain activities "affecting" com8
merce.
Congressional power to utilize the commerce clause as
complete in itself has extended that right to include "intrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with
or obstruct the exercise of the granted power."' Even though
an activity may have a "trivial" effect on interstate commerce, it may be included with other similar actions to fall
within the purview of the congressional commerce clause
power.1" For example, because they are commingled with
movements of air across state lines, air pollution particles
themselves are articles moving in interstate commerce and
are, therefore, subject to federal regulation." The activities
included within congressional regulation under the commerce clause are sufficiently broad to also include land use
problems as well as air and water pollution related to energy
development.
2. Property Clause
Another important source of federal authority is the
property clause of the U.S. Constitution which states:
7.

"The Congress shall have power .

.

. To regulate commerce with foreign

nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
8. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).
9. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942).
10. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
11. United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md. 1968),
423Archive
F.2d 469
(4th Cir. Scholarship,
1970), cert. denied,
Publishedaff'd
by Law
of Wyoming
1981 398 U.S. 904 (1970).
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The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall
be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the
United States, or of any particular State.1"
This clause vests Congress with plenary authority to
pass laws for the protection, management and disposition
of federal lands within the states. 8 This authority, together
with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the
Land,"' 4 gives the federal government the power to supersede state legislative authority which would otherwise be
applicable to the public domain.
It is interesting to note the emerging philosophy that
the federal government's authority over federal lands, combined with the necessary and proper clause, may also provide a basis for the federal imposition of restrictions on
the use of nonfederal lands which adjoin federal lands. 5
This federal interest over the public domain is considered
to be proprietary and will not invalidate the full effectiveness of state laws with respect to the public domain so long
as such state action is not inconsistent with the congressional
scheme for the use of the property.'
3. Power to Tax and Spend
Congressional taxing power has been used to obtain
results above and apart from the basic revenue-raising
purpose of such tax. It has been used to induce business
investment through investment tax credits, 7 to promote
conservation through windfall profits tax, 8 and for other
nonrevenue-raising purposes. The Supreme Court has been
willing to accept the justification of a tax measure on its
12.
13.
14.
15.

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
See Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273-74 (1954).
U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.
See generally Utah Power and Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389
(1917) and Rosenthal, note 5, at 31.
16. Id.
17. I.R.C. § 46-48 & 50.
18. I.R.C. § 4986-90.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/2
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face without regard to whether it attempts to regulate
other activities. 9
Congressional spending power must be used only for
the "general welfare. ' ' "9 However, the federal government
has continually placed conditions upon the receipt of federal
funds in order to obtain from the state or local levels of
government what it would not have been able to obtain
under its enumerated powers."'
B. State Power
The past decade has seen the emergence of a new set of
national issues involving federal lands and resources which
are imposing serious strains on the fabric of federal-state
relationships. Those with the highest current visibility involve the role of state government in federal programs
and proposals to increase domestic energy self-sufficiency
through the development of federally-owned energy resources. At present, no comprehensive or satisfactory set
of institutional arrangements has been developed to facilitate a coordinated federal and state governmental response
to energy and land-use planning issues. The awesome federal
power over massive tracts of Western lands has understandably inspired many feverish, ofttimes irrational, tirades against federal dominion by a growing number of
private and state government leaders. This movement has
been labeled the "Sagebrush Rebellion." Not long ago, Governor Matheson of Utah introduced his speech on energy
and the public lands with his sense of frustration:
The program lists me as the governor of Utah.
That is not entirely correct. I am governor of all
our citizens, but only 30 percent of our land. The
remainder is owned by the federal government. 2
19. See generally Rosenthal, The Federal Power to Protect the Environment;
Available Devices to Compel or Induce Desired Conduct, 45 S. CAL. L. REv.
397, 403 (1972).
20. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
21. See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, (10th
Cir 1980).
22. Address by Governor Scott M. Matheson, Conference on Energy and the
(August1981
19, 1977).
Lands
II, of
Park
City. Utah
PublishedPublic
by Law
Archive
Wyoming
Scholarship,
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The Western states have become increasingly disturbed
at their small amount of input into federal land management decisions, and rather than await congressional action
sanctioning a high level of state involvement in federal
land use, state decision-makers are exercising their constitutionally reserved powers to assert state legislative jurisdiction over public lands. These powers are more clearly
delineated below.
1. Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
The states generally exercise regulatory power over
land use by virtue of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.23 The powers not delegated to the federal government, nor granted to the citizens of the nation, are reserved
to the states by this amendment. These reserved powers
include "police powers" which broadly encompass the right
to "prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals,
education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so
as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources
and add to its wealth and prosperity." 4 Furthermore, the
power to implement and enforce land use controls, such as
zoning, is now well established as a valid exercise of a state's
police power, provided local mineral development permits
covering both federal surface and mineral rights are not
involved. 6 Thus, the use of police power has been strictly
upheld by the courts as it applies to federally-owned lands;
conversely, federal power over public lands has been broadly
construed." The judicially declared congressional power" to
protect wildlife and the ecological balance on public lands
has potentially far-reaching effects on state policy in public
23. U.S. Const. amend. X.
24. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).

25. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
26. Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080 (1979), aff'd 100 S. Ct.
1593 (1980).

27. Utah Power and Light Co. v. United States, supra note 14, at 404-05. In
this case the Court held that Congress has the power to ignore any state
desire to protect public lands from certain uses or develop them in a
manner potentially more beneficial to the citizens of the state. In other
words, the federal government, as proprietor, need not manage its lands
in a manner consistent with a state's duty to provide for the health, safety
and welfare of its citizens. See also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529
(1976).

28. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, at 539.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/2
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lands states where private and state lands are islands in
a sea surrounded by federally-owned lands."
The police powers of a state are generally thought of
as the least limitable of governmental powers. These powers
are limited only by provisions of the state and federal constitutions. In any case, proper exercise of the police power
must meet certain requisites:
(a) Proper Object-This means that the end sought
must be one which the "law deems sufficient to justify
protection [of] . . . public health, safety, morals and welfare."3
(b) Reasonable Relationship-The police power regulation must bear a reasonable relationship to the attainment
of the proper object. "The test is ... whether the legislative
body could have determined upon any reasonable basis that
the legislation is necessary or desirable for its intended
purpose."'"
(c) Not Arbitrary or Unreasonable-Thespecific application of the police power may not be arbitrary or unreasonable. The test for reasonableness is determined on the basis
of a balancing test. This test determines whether the "good"
to be achieved by the regulation justifies the "burden" placed
upon the regulated entity.2 To a more limited extent, land
use regulation and zoning, if properly applied with reasonableness, have been upheld as proper application of a state's
police power."
2. Eminent Domain
As a general rule, while a state's power to condemn
land does not extend to federal lands, 4 the federal government suffers no such disability. The federal government
29. Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979).
30. See White and Barney, Energy Development in the West: Conflict and
Coordination of Governmental Decision Making. 52 N.D.L. REV. 451, 457
(Spring 1976).
31. Garton, Ecology and the Police Power, 16 S.D.L. REV. 261, 264 (1971).
32. Adams v. Shannon, 7 Cal. App. 3d 427, 433, 86 Cal. Rptr. 641, 645 (1970).
33. Netherton, Implementation of Land Use Policy: Police Power v. Eminent
Domain, 3 LAND & WATER L. REv. 33, 38 (1968).
34. See Utah Power and Light v. United States, supra note 14, holding that a

federalScholarship,
lands for use
as a power plant.
may
not condemn
Publishedstate
by Law
Archive
of Wyoming
1981
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may condemn state land for a public purpose even if that
land is being used by the state for a governmental purpose. 5
The right of a state to take any class of property for
public use by eminent domain is inherent in state sovereignty. The implied grant of eminent domain arises from
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and similar
state constitutional provisions.36 Eminent domain must be
exercised only for public purpose T and property shall not
be taken or damaged without just compensation. 8
3. Taxing Power
Each state has as a plenary, essential attribute of sovereignty, the power to tax. This taxing power is concurrent
with the federal taxing power and may be applied simultaneously to the same items of private property. 9 The state's
taxing power must be for a "public purpose" and, if not,
will be a taking of property without due process of law.4"
C. Municipal and Local Powers
There are numerous types of political subdivisions of a
particular state, such as cities, counties, special districts,
organized townships, statutory municipalities, etc. Each of
these entities receives its power from the powers of the state
through constitutional provision, general statutes or enabling legislation. 1 Since the sources of local powers are carved
out of the larger state powers, the local governments are
strictly limited to exercising their governmental activities
within the bounds set by the limited powers granted in
constitutional or statutory language. Many western states
have delegated a good deal of control over land-use decision
making to local governments giving them discretionary
power to do such things as:
See Minn. v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939).
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1875).
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
See, e.g., Utah Const. art. 1, § 22. The fifth and fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution also impose a requirement of "just compensation"
on the states in exercising their power of eminent domain.
39. See, e.g., National Gas Pipeline Co. v. State Commission of Revenue and
Taxation, 155 Kan. 416, 125 P.2d 397 (1942).
40. Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920).
41. See, e.g., Nation v. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 279, I.A.F.F., 518 P.2d
831 (Wyo. 1974).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/2
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1. Prescribe environmental controls,42
2. Adopt floodplain management regulations,48
4
3. Engage in comprehensive planning, "

45
4. Adopt zoning regulations and zoning maps
(including planned unit developments),"4 and
48
47
5. Subdivision regulations and building codes.

In addition to discretionary land use controls, some
states are requiring mandatory actions on the part of local
governments to do such things as:
1. Adopting subdivision regulations, 9
2. Establishing planning commissions,5 ° and
3. Protecting commercial mineral deposits."
It is important to note that the courts construe local
government enabling legislation strictly.2 Each grant of
power to localities must contain an express delegation of
the power to act 8 even though such grants may have been
couched in general terms. In addition, actions by local governments will be held invalid unless there is close adherence
to such things as provisions for notice and hearing and
other procedural requirements contained in the enabling
legislation. 4
D. Regional Governmental Bodies
Some states have legislated authorization for bodies
such as regional planning commissions55 or other regional
42. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1-506 and 25-7-128 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
43. See, e.g., MONT. REv. CODE ANN. 76-5-301 to 302 (1979).
44. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 67-6501 to 6529 (1980); MONT. CODE ANN. 76-1-101

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

to 508 (1979); Wyo. Stat. § 15-1-601 (1977).
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-1 (1973); Wyo. Stat. § 15-1-601 (1977).
See, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. 278A.010 to .590 (1979).
See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. § 15-1-509 to 511 (1977).
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 30-28-201 to 209 (1973).
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-3-501 (1979).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-112 (1977).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-1-301 to 305 (1973).

52. City of Aurora v. Bogue, 176 Colo. 198, 489 P.2d 1295 (1971).
53. Gavel v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 167 Colo. 353, 447 P.2d, 209 (1968).
54. Holly Development, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 342 P.2d 1032 (Colo.
1959).
55. See, e.g., N.v. REV. STAT. §§ 278.010-.675 (1979).
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agencies to perform certain information clearing-house functions.5" These agencies are formed by cooperative agreement
or through delegation of some powers from a local government to the regional body as authorized by state law
for intergovernmental cooperation.5"
II.

FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT CONFLICTS

General Overview
While state and local governments are beginning to flex
their limited muscles in Western energy development, by
far the biggest factor in determining the full exploration
and development in the Overthrust Belt will be the various
agencies and departments of the federal government. It is
the policies and practices of the federal sovereign that will
determine land availability and access, exploration and
drilling techniques, and the cost effectiveness of any particular project in the Overthrust Belt. As an example of
the impact the federal government can play in energy devolpment, the Department of Interior on November 6, 1980,
announced that approximately 3,988,505 acres of previously
unavailable lands would be opened to mineral exploration.
Of this amount, 32,424 acres were opened for petroleum
exploration.
In addition to the direct actions of the federal government that will be discussed later, there is an emerging
tendency for the federal decision-makers to use indirect
manipulation of the police powers of the states to implement
the federal government's national policy objectives. 8 As an
outgrowth of the environmental movement and its philosophical extension into energy-related problems, there have
been numerous federal policy initiatives into areas of previously sacrosanct state, local and private decision-making.
This federal over-stepping of state police powers comes
through the incentive of huge sums of federal money becom56. Areawide clearing house review is provided under OMB Circular A-95, (Revised), 41 Fed. Reg. 2052 (1976).
57. Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-1-133 to 136 (1977).
58. See Dreyfus, Public Policy and Private Property, 12 Forum 885 (Spring

1977).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/2
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ing available to state and local governments if certain police
powers, such as land use planning, are initiated. 9 Other
areas where federal objectives are implemented through
imposing requirements on state programs include energy
conservation legislation, surface mining measures, and certainly air and water pollution control legislation.
With approximately twenty federal agencies having
some regulation or authority over energy development in
the Overthrust Belt area,"° it would be impossible to list
each area of potential conflict between these federal agencies.
Of these many agencies, the four most important in day-today exploration, drilling, and production activities are the
Departments of Interior, Agriculture, and Energy, and the
Environmental Protection Agency. The rules and regulations of these four agencies, applied as a whole, present the
largest impediment to full development of oil and gas resources. Superimposed upon such rules and regulations is
the greatest burden of all-the "delay" inherent in all large
multi-jurisdictional governmental bodies. Only recently has
delay (or intentional failure to act) by itself given rise to a
level of procedural court standing which has not existed
up to now."
Before commencing any specific intergovernmental conflicts, it should be noted that what follows is a representative sample of some of the most common governmental conflicts found in the Overthrust Belt area. This is by no means
exhaustive but is intended to address several of the most
significant conflicts.
A. Leasing in National Forests
The Department of Agriculture was created in 1862,62
59. E.g., Id. at 890, where it is stated that in § 1640 (94th Congress) the Senate
passed a measure to provide for the establishment of the Santa Monica
Mountain and Seashore Urban Recreation Area in the State of California.
In place of the usual federal acquisition of the properties necessary to
implement an outdoor recreation plan, the bill provides a sum of federal
funds which would become available only when the state and local entities
acting through a special commission had completed a land management
plan for the area which plan must be acceptable to the Secretary of Interior.
60. Handbook of Federal and Utah State Laws on Energy/Mineral Resource
Development (Jan. 1975).
61. Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, 499 F.Supp. 383 (D. Wyo.
mem., 396 1980).
62. Act of May 15, 1862, ch. 72, 12 Stat. 387.
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and the Forest Service was created in 1905 by transfer of
federal lands from the Department of Interior to the Department of Agriculture." Generally speaking, the Forest Service is concerned only with surface land management aspects
of mineral development.
Under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,64 the Secretary
of the Interior is given the authority to lease all public
lands which are known or believed to contain oil and gas
deposits.65 "The statute gives to the Secretary of the Interior
broad powers to issue oil and gas leases on public lands
within known structures of producing oil and gas fields
and to accept or reject oil and gas lease offers."66
Before 1945, the Secretary of the Interior, and those to
whom he had delegated his authority within the Department
of Interior, determined whether or not oil and gas leases
should be issued on National Forest System lands without
consulting the Department of Agriculture. However, in 1945
the Secretary of the Interior issued certain leases on National
Forest System lands which were particularly objectionable
to the Department of Agriculture, thereby prompting an
exchange of correspondence" between the two Secretaries.
This correspondence resulted in an agreement that the
Department of Interior would consider Department of Agriculture recommendations in making decisions on oil and
gas leasing. That early correspondence provided simply that,
if the Department of Agriculture would submit its recommendations to the Department of Interior during the time
the BLM was considering the lease applications, the recommendations would be taken into account.
The long-term results of that arrangement between the
Departments of Interior and Agriculture have been de63.
64.
65.
66.

16 U.S.C. § 472 (1976).
30 U.S.C. § 181 et. seq (1976).
30 U.S.C. § 226(a) (1976).
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, supra note 61, at 388. Udall
v. Tollman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965), and McTiernan v. Franklin, 508 F.2d 885
(10th Cir. 1975).
67. Copies of this correspondence are available in the office of the Land &
Water Law Review.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/2
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scribed in detail in a Wyoming federal district court case,
68
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus:
From that correspondence has developed the
policy of the Department of the Interior to request
the Forest Service to make recommendations on all
oil and gas lease applications involving public National Forest System lands, and not to act on any
noncompetitive, open oil and gas lease applications
involving public domain National Forest System
lands without having received a recommendation
from the Forest Service. Thus, when a noncompetitive, open land, oil and gas lease application is
received by the Idaho, Wyoming, or Montana State
Office of the Bureau of Land Management covering
surface lands managed by the Forest Service, the
Forest Service Regional Office or Forest Supervisor's Office are sent a copy of the application
and a request that the Forest Service make a recommendation on the application. (Stipulation of
Facts, Nos. 69, 71, 76, 78, and 79).
The practice of the Forest Service has been to
recommend either issuance of the oil and gas lease
on which recommendation is sought, in whole or in
part, without any restrictions; or that the lease be
issued in whole or in part, with certain stipulations
attached; or that the lease application be rejected
in whole or in part. (Stipulation of Facts, Nos. 69
and 71). The recommendations of the Forest Service are always followed by the BLM with respect
to the issuance of oil and gas leases, although the
terms recommended by the Forest Service have
been modified on occasion by the Secretary of the
Interior following an administrative appeal by an
applicant. (Stipulation of Facts, Nos. 77 and 84).
The Bureau of Land Management state offices
in Idaho, Wyoming, and Montana do not make
independent assessments of the surface values of
public lands prior to acting on oil and gas lease
applications, nor do they make independent assessments of whether or not the issuance of an oil and
gas lease, with or without the proposed Forest Service stipulations, would adversely affect surface
Foundation v. Andrus, supra note 61.

States Legal
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values. Rather, it is the policy of the Department of
the Interior and the Idaho, Wyoming, and Montana
state offices of the BLM to follow Forest Service
recommendations on all oil and gas lease applications involving National Forest System lands unless reason is shown for doing otherwise. (Stipulation of Facts, No. 84)."
It generally has been the policy of the Department of
the Interior and the practices of the state Bureau of Land
Management ("BLM") offices in the Overthrust Belt states
to refrain from issuing an oil and gas lease until a recommendation has been received from the Forest Service. Therefore, if the Forest Service decides not to submit any recommendations, it has effectively decided that no leases will be
issued. Thus, by its own practice, the Bureau of Land Management will not issue oil and gas leases on national forest
lands without Forest Service approval even though the
Bureau of Land Management wishes to develop the mineral
potential of those lands. This problem is further compounded
by the complete absence of rules and regulations that describe the leasing relationship between the two departments."
As a result of the Mountain States case, the Bureau of Land
Management is in the process of developing rules and regulations that will set forth the respective powers and duties
of the Forest Service and BLM on procedures for issuing
leases within national forest areas.
The result of this practice has been to empower the
Secretary of Agriculture to withdraw large areas of land
from mineral exploration and development based solely on
a desire to manage the land for single purpose classification, such as wilderness, even though it has no statutory
power to make such withdrawals. For example, the Forest
Service, under the program entitled "Roadless Area Review
and Evaluation" (RARE II), has, in many instances, re69. Id. at 388-89.
70. Specifically, the following areas have been subject to a no leasing policy:
RARE II area 4-613 covering a portion of Overthrust lands in Idaho and
Wyoming known as the Palisades area; and RARE II area 1-485 which is
a horseshoe shaped area around the perimeter of the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area in Montana.
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fused to issue any oil and gas leases within areas under
consideration for wilderness designation.
It is not surprising then that this relationship between
the Departments of Interior and Agriculture would spawn
litigation to test the legal authority behind the 1945 correspondence and the practice that has evolved from it. In the
Mountain States case,' the Wyoming federal court held that
the withdrawal of large areas of public lands from leasing
based upon the Forest Service's RARE II program, violated
the withdrawal provisions of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 ("FLPMA").72 It also held that
such withdrawals must be reported to Congress or, in the
alternative, the lands must be released for oil and gas leasing.
Furthermore, both the Departments of Interior and Agriculture were each ordered to promulgate rules and regulations governing the standard policies on which "oil and gas
lease applications may be rejected, approved, or suspended
and which related to the principles on which the cooperation"
between each department "with respect to such leasing activity, is based. . ...
An important element of the Mountain States case is
the holding that, while the mere filing on an oil and gas
lease application grants no vested rights, the applicant does
have standing to seek judicial review of administrative
delay amounting to a refusal to act. The court states:
When administrative inaction has precisely
the same effect on the rights of the parties as
denial of the requested agency action, an agency
may not prevent judicial review by masking agency
policy in the form of inaction rather than an order
denying the action requested. [citations omitted.]
We cannot allow the Defendants to accomplish
by inaction what they74could not do by formal administrative order. .. .
71. Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, supra note 61.
72. Id. at 395. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L.
94579, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 16, 30, 40, 43 U.S.C.,

but mainly codified in 43 U.S.C. § 1701-1782) [hereinafter cited as
FLPMA].
73. Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, supra note 61.
396-97.
74. Id.
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In a dramatic departure from past practices, the
Solicitor of the Department of Interior elceted not to appeal
the Mountain States case not withstanding its precedential
importance. The Mountain States decision is a first step in
attempting to solve the problems created by excessive intergovernmental delays in oil and gas leasing in national
forests and to remove the jurisdictional ambiguities surrounding the BLM and Forest Service implementation of
the 1945 correspondence.
B. Leasing and Exploration in BLM Wilderness Study
Areas
In 1976, Congress enacted FLPMA to consolidate the
3,000 or more laws which governed the BLM. While FLPMA
pertains mainly to the BLM, this law applies in some degree
to the national forests and other large areas of federal lands
in addition to all lands administered by the BLM. Unfortunately, FLPMA contains some ambiguities that are not
easily resolved and have been subject to much debate. For
example, in September of 1978, Solicitor of the Department
of the Interior, Leo Krulitz, "issued a legal opinion interpreting Section 603 of FLPMA in relation to the entire Act,
as well as interpreting the section on its face. The Solicitor's
opinion is considered to be the law of the Department of the
Interior and the BLM on both the federal and state levels. 75
"In accordance with the opinion, a Wilderness Inventory
Handbook was issued September 30, 1978," which "set forth
the policies and procedures to implement the Solicitor's
opinion." In addition, all BLM offices received additional
instructions in the form of Interim Management and Policy
Guidelines for Wilderness Review. Pursuant to the Handbook, the BLM undertook a cursory and then a thorough
inventory of the lands under its jurisdiction to determine
if any had wilderness characteristics as defined by the
Wilderness Act."6 Qualifying areas were designated Wilderness Study Areas.
75. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Andrus, 500 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (D.
Wyo., 1980).
76. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131 et 8eq. (1976).
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The result of the Solicitor's opinion and the directives
issued by the BLM pursuant thereto, was to institutionalize
a nonimpairment policy for oil and gas development. That
is, an oil and gas development project would be denied if
such projects would "impair" the suitability of an area for
preservation as wilderness for an area under wilderness
consideration. The BLM policy was that "the agency cannot permit the possible wilderness characteristics to be
destroyed before those characteristics have been determined
to exist."77
Almost immediately after the Solicitor's opinion was
issued, several oil and gas industry associations voiced strong
protest to the apparent wilderness preservationist leanings
of the opinion, especially the perceived disregard for the
continued mineral leasing language contained in FLPMA
Section 603 (c)."7 The opinion was viewed as especially egregious because it would not permit the same level of exploration in a wilderness study area that would later be permitted
if the area were congressionally determined to be a wilderness area and thus came under Section 4(d) (3) of the
Wilderness Act.
Suit was commenced by the Rocky Mountain Oil and
Gas Association (RMOGA) challenging the Solicitor's opinion and the ensuing regulations and guidelines as contrary
to law, arbitrary, capricious and completely erroneous. On
November 7, 1980, Federal District Court Judge Kerr of
Wyoming ruled in favor of RMOGA, and held that the
statutory construction set forth in the Solicitor's opinion
was clearly erroneous and not supportable of statutory
wilderness policies and that the opinion must be set aside
because mineral development is completely and totally sacrificed for environmental concerns." The court's reason for
striking down the Solicitor's opinion was the factual determination that the nonimpairment standard was so strictly
applied that oil and gas development had come to a virtual
77. Wilderness Inventory Handbook, Bureau of Land Management, (September

1978).

78. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1976).
79. RMOGA
v. Andrus,
supra note
75, at 1344.1981
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halt in wilderness study areas and that existing leases in
wilderness areas had been rendered merely as "shell" leases.
The court could not condone the termination of existing
rights contrary to Section 701 of FLPMA by the government's action of refusing on one hand to permit drilling
and exploration and at the same time extending the other
hand to collect lease rentals.
One of the most important portions of the opinion was
the court's holding that an unconstitutional taking occurs if
a wilderness stipulation is attached to a lease which in effect
denies development rights. This holding on stipulations will
most likely be applied to leases issued in Overthrust Belt
areas under the RARE II inventory by the Forest Service.
The RMOGA case has been appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals by the Department of Interior and
by a coalition of environmental groups headed by the Sierra
Club. However, in a very surprising move, the BLM decided
not to contest the portion of the court decision which relates
to pre-FLPMA leases. By an instruction memorandum dated
March 12, 1981,80 the Director of the BLM issued the directive that
exploration, development, and production can take
place on a lease within a [wilderness study area]
if the lease was issued on or before October 21,
1976, even though the impacts would ordinarily
constitute impairment as defined in the IMP [the
BLM guidelines].
This action by the BLM further appears unusual because the Department of Interior has not withdrawn or in
any way amended Solicitor Krulitz's opinion upon which its
original nonimpairment policy was based. Nor did the court
in the RMOGA case make a strong distinction between preFLPMA leases and those issued after the enactment of that
law. In any event, the BLM field offices are recognizing the
exercise of lease rights within BLM Wilderness Study Areas,
subject to other environmental safeguards such as NTL-6 1
80. BLM Instruction Memorandum No. 81-325, dated March 12, 1981, to expire
Sept. 30, 1982.
81. See note 153, infra.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/2
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While the RMOGA case is a significant step forward
in obtaining access to federal oil and gas in the Overthrust
Belt, it does not address-and perhaps could not addresstwo problems created by the Solicitor's opinion. First, the
holding in the RMOGA case provides that the BLM Wilderness Review Rules and Regulations were invalid. The lack
of such rules and regulations creates an administrative procedural vacuum under which the BLM is without guidance
in which to operate its mandated wilderness review program.
Thus, even if a wilderness study area is opened to development on a limited impairment basis, the BLM will not have
the guidelines ready in the near future under which the local
BLM offices may operate. Second, the statutory clock is
still running on the time left for oil and gas exploration in
wilderness areas and wilderness study areas. Development of
lands subject to Section 4(d) (3) of the Wilderness Act82
will end at the beginning of 1984 and development of wilderness lands subject to Section 603(c) of FLPMA 81 will expire in 1991. At the end of those periods, no new exploration
would be permitted in such wilderness areas.
C. Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines
Regulation of exploration and production is only part
of the overall regulatory picture. The ability to get the
product out of the ground is of relatively little significance
if that product cannot be marketed. Getting the product,
especially natural gas, to market involves another area of
governmental restraint.
While the experts may disagree on the estimate of
discovered and undiscovered recoverable reserves of oil and
natural gas in the Overthrust Belt (including the Disturbed
Belt and Hinge Line areas), there is no dispute that the
volumes of natural gas annually produced, or to be produced,
in this area are too large to be consumed solely within the
sparsely populated Rocky Mountain states. With estimates
ranging as high as 100 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d) (3) (1976).
83. 43
§ 1782(c)
(1976). Scholarship, 1981
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10 billion barrels of oil,s4 it is obvious that extensive interstate pipeline systems will be required to carry these volumes of gas to the heavily populated West Coast, Midwest
and East Coast markets.
Two such direct pipeline projects have been proposed.
One is the Trailblazer System Pipeline Project,"5 a group
of five pipeline companies which will transport gas to
the industrial Upper Midwest and Middle Atlantic states.
The other is the Rocky Mountain Pipeline Project,86 a fourcompany partnership which proposes to transport Overthrust gas to Southern California. Although not directly
entering the Overthrust area, a third project being proposed
by two pipeline companies, the Trans-Anadarko Pipeline, 7
would carry some Overthrust gas to the Southeastern United
States.
While eleven marketers of natural gas are willing to
cooperate to get this vital natural resource to consumers,
they are bogged down in regulatory red tape. To obtain
permission, a pipeline company must prove to an agency
of the federal government that the project is in the public
interest, meeting the test of "public convenience and necessity."88 Although the pipeline projects face many of the
same hurdles as the producers do in getting environmental
clearances and rights-of-way, their biggest test comes before
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) which
"certificates" (grants a certificate of public convenience
and necessity) to all interstate pipeline projects in the
United States. The certification process is not noted for its
speed. The original application in the Trailblazer lead docket89
has been pending since November, 1978 and even though this
84. James W. Vanderbeck, Vice President and Regional Manager of AMOCO
Production Company as reported in the Salt Lake Tribune, November 12,

1980 at D1; Cummings, Summary of Activity "Hinge Line" Overthrust
Belt through December 1977, at 55 (1978).
85. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [hereafter "FERC"] Docket Nos.
CP79-80, CP80-7, and CP80-380. The Trailblazer System Pipeline Project,

if approved, will extend from the Whitney Canyon Field near Evanston,
Wyoming to interconnect with the facilities of Northern Natural Gas
Company near Beatrice, Nebraska.

86. FERC Docket No. CP79-424.
*87. FERC Docket No. CP80-17.
88. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f; See also 18 C.F.R. Part 157 (1980).
89. FERC Docket No. CP 79-80 was filed Nov. 21, 1978.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/2
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matter has been expedited by the FERC staff, final FERC
approval may not be granted until late 1981 or even mid1982.
In addition, all natural gas in the Overthrust Belt which
is produced from wells spudded after February 18, 1977, is
subject to the pricing provisions of the Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978 (NGPA).

°

The NGPA prescribes wellhead

prices for natural gas, taking virtually all of those pricing
decisions out of the hands of the FERC, and further provides for deregulation of most natural gas prices by 1985.
Nevertheless, the FERC still has tight control over the
setting of transportation rates, including the all-important
rate of return. If these rates are not set at an attractive
economic level, there will not be the necessary incentive to
build the pipeline projects.
The bottom line for producers and consumers, therefore, is that, if the FERC does not provide sufficient economic incentives, through ratemaking, to induce the building
of the necessary pipelines with the necessary capacity, then
even though the gas and oil may be discovered in abundant
quantities in the Overthrust, there will be no practical
method to transport it to the marketplace. Thus, most oil
would not be producible because it would require venting
or flaring associated gas which would violate the anti-waste
statutes of all Rocky Mountain states."
D. Other Federal Arrangements
Normally, agencies of the federal government have
sufficient administrative and legal expertise to solve most
interjurisdictional disputes. When areas of jurisdictional
overlap or vacancy arise, the agencies have been sufficiently
responsive to provide a workable joint solution.
The Forest Service and the U.S. Geological Survey
have determined that a joint cooperative agreement would
90. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432, 42 U.S.C. § 7255
(1978).
91. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 47-316 (1967); Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 (Supp.
1980); Wyo. Stat. § 30-5-109 (1977).
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assist the surface-use concerns of both agencies. On March
4, 1977, a cooperative agreement was entered between the
two agencies.92
The agreement provides for mutual cooperation for oil
and gas operations on National Forest System lands in
accordance with law and the authorities, responsibilities and
duties of each agency. (A more thorough analysis of this
cooperative agreement is contained in the "solutions" portion of this paper.)
III. FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICTS

A. General Overview
Perhaps the greatest potential for future intergovernmental conflicts exists in the arena occupied by federal and
state governments. Each has constitutional authority for
its actions and each has indicated a willingness to expand
its control to the full limit of that authority. The most
evident conflict will occur in the area of state and local
statutory land-use controls and land-use planning authorities. As two commentators have stated,
the cardinal rule to keep in mind when evaluating
state-federal conflicts is that the supremacy clause
of the Constitution clearly states that the Constitution and legitimate federal enactments are the supreme law of the land, so long as the enactments
are based on enumerated powers as opposed to proprietary powers. Consequently, the question is not
who has priority in cases of conflict, but is rather
a question of whether conflict actually exists."
B. Federal-State Land Use Planning
1. Land Use Planning by the BLM
Under pressure from the courts and environmental
groups, there has been a rapid increase in federal land-use
92. A copy of this cooperative agreement is on file at the Land and Water
Law Review Office.

93. White and Barry, supra note 1, at 493-94.
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planning that is so overwhelming that it could create procedural obstacles far more restrictive than formal withdrawal mechanisms. Right-of-way corridors, areas of critical environmental concern, endangered species and their
habitats, and other federal programs could limit oil and
gas development as effectively as a complete withdrawal.
Prior to FLPMA, the BLM had not developed a cohesive,
long-range management program because the BLM was
placed in the position of a custodian pending eventual
disposition of the lands under the Taylor Grazing Act of
19349" and other legislation. Passage of the Classification
and Multiple Use Act of 1964"5 (CMUA) alleviated the
problem during the six-year life of the Act. Under CMUA,
the BLM was given authority and direction to classify the
unappropriated public domain land and to recommend disposal or retention of federal lands subject to appropriate
management. Retained land was to be managed for multiple
uses such as environmental conservation, minerals exploitation, livestock forage, wildlife habitat, vegetative product
development, watershed management or recreation use.
The passage of FLPMA marked the first time that
major, detailed land-use planning and management requirements were imposed upon the BLM. Section 102 (a) describes
in broad terms the policy by which the lands will be managed and directs the BLM to administer its public domain
lands "on the basis of multiple use and sustained yield," in
a manner that will protect environmental resources but will
also "recognize the nation's need for domestic sources of
minerals, food, timber and fiber from the public lands, including implementation of the Mining and Minerals Policy
Act of 1970."96 Thus, FLPMA has a balanced approach
requiring reasonable tradeoffs between development and
environmental concerns.
In addition to the policies and directives in FLPMA,
the BLM is also adopting in its planning the intergovern94. 43 U.S.C. § 315 et seq., repealed by FLPMA.
95. 43 U.S.C. § 1411 et seq. (1964). The act expired on December 23, 1970.

96. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1976).
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mental cooperation suggested in the passage of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969' (NEPA).
Federal-state intergovernmental cooperation has also
been greatly influenced by the Office of Management and
Budget's Revised Circular A-95, which provides guidance
to federal agencies for cooperating with state and local
governments in the evaluation, review and coordination of
federal and federally-assisted programs and projects. 8 0MB
Circular A-95 is also buttressed by FLPMA Section 202 (c)
(9) requiring the Secretary of Interior, the senior federal
public land manager, to coordinate his efforts with state
land managers and with state land resource management
programs, 9 provided such a program exists.
2. Land Use Planning by States
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co.,' the power to implement and enforce
land use controls, such as zoning, is now well established
as a valid exercise of the state's police power. Furthermore,
the Court has determined that land use regulation imposed
for environmental protection purposes is a legitimate exercise of the police power.' Cloaked with this judicial encouragement, the states have significantly increased their
involvement in land-use planning, especially in areas not
previously regulated. Some new areas of involvement include air quality, mined land reclamation, underground
water disposal, pipeline routes and similar activities.
3. Access to State Lands
An area that has caused some of the most heated debates
between state and federal land managers involves access
across federal lands for development of mineral leases on
state lands. One of the areas most closely involved in this
federal-state conflict is the state of Utah.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1976).
OMB Circular A-95 (Revised), 41 Fed. Reg. 2052 (1976).
43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (9) (1976).
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 25, at 395.
Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1974).
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When Utah was admitted into the United States in
1896, Section 6 of its Enabling Act" 2 granted to the state
sections 2, 16, 32 and 36 in every township for support of
the state's common schools, excluding sections in forest
reserves and Indian reservations. The BLM administers
approximately 45 percent of the lands in Utah, and many
state school sections are surrounded by those federal lands.
Many of the state school sections are accessible by existing
roads, but others are in essentially roadless areas. As a
result of the state school land grants, the pattern of property ownership in much of the state resembles a checkerboard with neither the state nor the BLM able to take any
action with regard to its land holdings without impacting
the other's land.
Section 603 (c) of FLPMA' 0 ' requires that roadless BLM
lands of sufficient size and characteristics must be examined
for their potential for inclusion in the wilderness system.
A statutory conflict for management of wilderness study
areas exists between § 603 (c) and § 701 (g) (6) of FLPMA.
Section 603 (c) of FLPMA"' states that "During the period
of review of such areas and until Congress has determined
otherwise, the Secretary shall continue to manage such lands
.. . so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for
preservation as wilderness. . .

FLPMA 105

."

However, § 701 (g) (6) of

provides that "[n]othing in the Act shall be

construed as.

.

. amending, limiting, or infringing the exist-

ing laws providing grants of lands to the States."
Because of difficulties in obtaining access across federal land or because an access road was constructed without authority across federal lands, both Utah and the federal
government brought suit in federal court for judicial clarification of the access issue across wilderness study areas.
In Utah v. Andrus, (also known as the Cotter Coal case),
the federal district court ruled that the state must be allowed
access to the state school trust lands so that those lands may
Act of July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107.
43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1976).
Id.
Savings provisions of FLPMA, now given in notes following 43 U.S.C. §
(1976).
1701
Published
by Law
Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981
102.
103.
104.
105.

27

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 16 [1981], Iss. 2, Art. 2

484

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVI

be developed in a manner that will provide funds for the
common schools. Also, the court held that it was the intent
of Congress that "access rights of the state cannot be so
restricted as to destroy the land's economic value" or "to
render the lands incapable of their full economic development." However, the court held that while the federal government did not have the right to deny access, it did have
general authority to regulate the method and route of
access." °6 The parties to the case have decided not to appeal
the decision.
In still another dispute between the state of Utah and
the BLM, Utah filed suit in federal court to determine
whether the state's Class D road system should be considered as "roads" for wilderness review purposes. In Utah v.
Andrus,"°7 the state alleged that the BLM, while performing
its wilderness inventories pursuant to § 603 of FLPMA, had
failed to identify, recognize, preserve and protect state Class
D roads located on federal lands. The state of Utah later
moved to dismiss the case because the BLM had released
108 units of the original 176 Utah units under study for
intensive wilderness inventory, thus removing the majority
of the federal-state conflict over state class D road access
across BLM land.
In yet another case, United States v. Grand County,'°
the federal government brought suit against a southern
Utah county alleging in effect, that Grand County and its
commissioners were interfering with the BLM's control of
access to a road located in Negro Bill Canyon, near Moab,
Utah. Negro Bill Canyon had been recommended by the
BLM for wilderness study. The BLM had several times
placed barriers on the road in the canyon in order to prevent public access to and use of the road and thereby protect the wilderness characteristics of the canyon. Grand
County had openly removed the barriers and improved a
portion of the road near the bottom of the canyon. This
106. Utah v. Andrus, supra note 29. See also Ames and Ames, Access Rights to
Minerals-United States Cotter Corp., 1 J. of Energy Law and Policy
109 (1980).
107. Civ. No. C-79-450 (D. Utah) (later dismissed).
108. Civ. No. C-79-483 (D. Utah).
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case was later dismissed when both the BLM and Grand
County entered into a memorandum of understanding dated
November 24, 1980 which effectively resolved the jurisdictional dispute between those government entities.
The fact that all three of these Utah disputes with the
federal government had to be brought to the litigation stage
before the parties could come to mutually agreeable solutions to their problems indicates that full cooperation in the
federal-state jurisdictional arena has not yet occurred.
4. State Oil and Gas Conservation
Probably the earliest expression of public interest in
the protection of energy resources is found in state oil and
gas conservation statutes requiring the plugging of abandoned wells, prohibition of wasteful resource utilization,
and prevention of the escape of oil or gas. 109
In general, the constitutionality of state oil and gas
conservation, production and use regulations has been
supported on these grounds:
(a) They are within the police power of a state to
enact and enforce legislation to protect the correlative rights
of owners of land within a common source of supply of oil
and gas; (b) They safeguard the public interest in oil and
gas as a natural resource of the state; and (c) They prevent or abate surface nuisances resulting from the operation
of oil and gas wells." 0
State commissions are authorized to enforce conservation measures and to establish drilling units in any oil and
gas pool for the prevention of waste and protection of correlative rights. Within these drilling units, the commissions
may determine the proper location and spacing of wells and
OF OIL AND GAS, A LEGAL HISTORY: 1948
k1949).; See, also, Balkovatz, Practice and Procedure Before Oil and Gas
ommissions-Some Nuts and Bolts, 25 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 14-1
(1979).
110. See Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm., 286 U.S. 210 (1932); Bandini
Petroleum Co. v. Superior Ct., 284 U.S. 8 (1931); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,
(1900).
Published177
byU.S.
Law 190
Archive
of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981

109. See MURPHY, CONSERVATION

29

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 16 [1981], Iss. 2, Art. 2

486

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVI

may restrict well production on a showing that correlative
rights of adjacent landowners would be jeopardized. 1 '
With regard to federal lands, the Mineral Leasing Act"'
provides general authorization for the Secretary of Interior
to prescribe rules for the "prevention of undue waste" for
all leasable minerals".. subject to the condition that "none
of such provisions shall be in conflict with the laws of the
state in which the leased property is situated.""' 4 However,
some of the functions of the Secretary of Interior such as to
promulgate regulations for the setting of rates of production,
and to establish diligence requirements, among others, have
'
been transferred to the Secretary of Energy."
The Secretary of Energy is also authorized to approve
communitization plans and federal unit plans of operation
for federal leases in order to conserve the natural resources
of any oil and gas pool, which may also embrace lands not
owned by the federal government." 6 Such plans may contain a provision whereby authority to administer and modify
the plan is delegated to a state," ' although this is rarely, if
ever, done. Generally, a spacing order of an oil and gas conservation commission is sufficient authority for the Department of Energy to approve a communitized plan of development to cover the same sized drilling unit provided in the
state order.
Usually, states have not attempted to apply their conservation authority to lands within a federal unit. An approved federal plan of development is usually sufficient.
However, federal-state conflict can arise when an oil and
gas pool extends into a unit and if the unit operator attempts
to locate unit wells too close to the unit boundary. The problem arises when the area outside the unit is spaced and the
111. Oil and gas conservation statutes for all states are set out in
5 OIL AND GAS, ch 28 (2nd ed. 1954) and (Supp. 1980).
112. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et. seq. (Supp. III, 1979).
113. 30 U.S.C. § 187 (Supp. III, 1979).

SUMMERS,

114. 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1970).

115. Id.
116. These powers were originally granted the Secretary of the Interior [30
U.S.C. § 226(j) (1970)] but were then transferred to the Secretary of
Energy [42 U.S.C. § 7152(b) (Supp. III, 1979)]. See also the note at 30

U.S.C. § 226 (Supp. III, 1979).

117. See 30 U.S.C. § 226(j) (1976) and note 116 supra.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/2
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wells inside the unit do not adhere to that spacing pattern,
with the result that correlative rights may be adversely
affected.
IV.

STATE-STATE CONFLICTS

Few actual oil and gas exploration and development
conflicts exist between the states. When they do occur, the
states' agencies have been cooperative in reaching reasonable
solutions. For example, several of the oil and gas fields"'
around Evanston, Wyoming, extend across the Utah-Wyoming state border. Joint meetings between the Wyoming
Oil and Gas Commission and the Utah Board of Oil, Gas,
and Mining have been held to receive evidence so that both
agencies may render a compatible joint order. When such
joint meetings have not been feasible, each agency has made
an accommodation for the decision of the other agency." 9
V.

FEDERAL-LOCAL CONFLICTS

"Since local governments are political subdivisions of
the state, conflicts between federal and local land use controls are simply federal-state conflicts"'' 0 and may be resolved under the same principles set out in the following
provisions of this paper.
VI. RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS

As a beginning point, many minor intergovernmental
conflicts may be solved by the simple mechanism of a joint
meeting of the government leaders and industry representatives. It is important to remember in arranging the
meeting to include the industry and governmental decisionmakers who have sign-off authority to bind the parties.
Often this technique will facilitate full communication of
the objectives for energy development so as to answer the
118. Anschutz Ranch, Anschutz Ranch East, Glass Cock and Yellow Creek fields.
119. For example, the Utah Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining and the Wyoming
Oil and Gas Conservation Commission have held joint hearings on the
Yellow Creek Field which extends across state lines.
120. White and Barry, supra note 1, at 506. Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
601 F.2d 1080, aff'd 100 S.Ct. 1593 (1980).
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particular concerns of each agency. When such meetings
are successful, formal and informal cooperative agreements
may be reached. Unfortunately, this may only serve as a
case-by-case solution and may not address any larger jurisdictional problems that may have originally created the
conflict.
If such joint cooperation cannot be obtained, then resort to other forms of relief such as litigation or statutory
changes may be required. Litigation also is flawed by its
case-by-case approach which often merely defines or interprets what a particular course of legislation was intended
to mean. Litigation has been unsatisfactory in resolving the
much larger issues that could be solved by joint federal,
state and local land-use planning.
A. Authority Verification
"Since each political jurisdiction considers itself to be
unique, . . . there are innumerable opportunities for over-

lapping, conflicting and duplicating efforts in planning and
management of energy development.""1 1 At present, no comprehensive or satisfactory set of institutional arrangements
has been developed to facilitate a coordinated federal and
state response to these issues. To the extent possible, conflicts may be minimized if the authority of a federal, state
or local jurisdiction is ascertained. Often, poorly staffed
state or local government agencies are not fully aware of the
limits of their authority. When one such agency is clearly
and illegally infringing on the jursidiction of another, communication of the overstepped authority by informal correspondence to the transgressor may resolve the problem. If
not, then some other relief such as litigation or clarifying
statutory changes may be required.
B. Federal Preemption and Supremacy
Recent years have shown a burgeoning increase in
national programs and policies addressing our energy de121.

White and Barry, supra note 1, at 513.
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velopment needs. To the extent that the impacted states
and regions are able to make their views known at the
federal level-whether through public opinion, congressional
influence, or legal obstruction of particular federal proposals-accommodation of state interests is usually made
on a case-by-case or issue-by-issue basis. While the federal
government is generally entitled to perform its proprietary
functions without conforming to the police power regulations of a state,' this rule will not apply when Congress
has expressly required federal compliance with state laws,"2 3
24
or where such compliance will not frustrate federal policy.
When the traditional approach to accommodation of
state interest fails, federal agencies exercise federal preemption, often without a genuine effort to resolve or accommodate potentially divergent state or federal interests. For
example, on public lands, the states are faced with the problem that, pursuant to the Property and Supremacy clauses
of the Constitution,'. 5 the United States has the primary
The authority of the
right to control its development.'
states is relegated to a secondary position of influence. As
the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Utah Power and Light
Co. v. United States, while a state may have jurisdictional
powers over lands within its borders belonging to the United
States:
This jurisdiction does not extend to any matter that
is not consistent with full power in the United
States to protect its lands, to control their use and
to prescribe in what manner others may acquire
rights in them.'
Accordingly, to the extent federal law does not mandate
state input and review, state legislation may not stand as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes in122. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 432, 451 (1931).
123. EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200 (1976); Alabama v. Seeber, 502 F.2d 1238
(5th Cir. 1974).
124. Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918); United States v. Hatahley,
220 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 351 U.S. 173 (1956).
125. See notes 7-16 supra and accompanying text.
126. Cornfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897).
127. Utah Power and Light Co. v. United States, supra note 15, at 404.
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tended by congressional directives for the management of
federal lands."2 8
1. Test of Preemption
Generally, courts have been cautious in upsetting state
regulation, and will do so only when it finds that Congress
has "clearly manifested" its intention to displace the constitutional authority of the states.' The following is a
description of the factors that the courts have considered
in determining whether federal preemption applies to state
actions.
(a) Physical Impossibility. Congressional intent will
not be a factor and federal exclusion of state law will be
required where compliance with both federal and state law
is a physical impossibility. 3 '
(b) Implied Intent. Where Congress has not expressly
prescribed dual regulation, nor equivocally declared its exclusive authority over a particular subject matter, preemption may nevertheless be "implied.""'. The finding of implicit
intent to displace state law may be based upon: (1) The
intent of Congress as revealed by the language of the statute
and legislative history;" 2 (2) The "pervasiveness" of the
federal regulatory scheme as authorized and directed by
Congress and as carried into effect by the administering
federal agency;"' (3) The nature of the subject matter
regulated and whether it is one that demands "exclusive
federal regulation in order to achieve uniformity vital to
national interests,""' 4 (4) Whether, under the circumstances
of the particular case, the state policy may produce a result
inconsistent with the object of the federal statute;"'

(5)

128. See FLPMA § 202(c) (9), 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (9) (Supp. 1980).
129. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (1949).
130. Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Ventura
County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080, aff'd 100 S. Ct. 1593 (1980).
131. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1974).
132. Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, supra note 130 at 147-50.
133. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-04 (1956); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., supra note 131, at 230; City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
134. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-44 (1959);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
135. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,stupra note 131, at 230 (1974).
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When the effects of state actions on interstate commerce
are only incidental, the court will apply a balancing test.
"[I]t will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of a degree;"

'136

and (6) Whether or

not the area has traditionally been one of state and local
control."' This is bolstered by a strong judicial presumption
of validity given to state and local regulations.'
C. Administrative Action
We turn next to an examination of fedral preemption
created by federal administrative rules and regulations.
Clearly, there can be preemption under self-executing statutes, but what about rules and regulations under non-selfexecuting statutes? Will administrative action be similarly
preemptive? The answer is yes. When Congress places an
area of commerce in the jurisdiction of an agency, and when
the agency actively and actually regulates that area, then
preemption will occur. The only way to salvage a conflicting
state program is to determine whether the federal agency
does, in fact, have power over the area and if so, whether
it is actively and legitimately exercising it. If so, the administrative action of the agency is merely an extension of the
power granted to it by Congress, and contrary state rules
and regulations would be considered as being opposed to the
intent of Congress that the agency have exclusive -authority
in the field.'39
It should be noted, however, that courts have attempted
to interpret agency action under the "principle of fair
accommodation," in such a manner "to avoid finding a con136. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); See also Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); -Soap and Detergents
Ass'n v. Chicago, 357 F. Supp. 44 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Palladio, -Inc. v.
Diamond, 321 F. Supp; 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd 440 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 983 (1971).
137. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra note 131, at 230. See also Rancho
Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 390 F. Supp. 1004, 1005-06
(C.D. Cal. 1975).
138. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
139. Wallach, Whose Intent? A Study of Administrative Preemption: State Regulation of Cable Television, 25 CAsE W. L. REV. 258 (1975).
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flict that would preempt state action, unless the conflict is
inherent in the character of the federal action."'"4
D. State Regulation of Federal Lands
The Western states have never accepted sole federal
management of the 704 million acres of proprietary land,
or the 761 million total acres"" of land owned by the federal
government. When faced with an increasingly unresponsive
federal land manager, the Western states have become disturbed by the problem. The states are not waiting for the
federal government to ask for their input but instead are
flexing their constitutionally reserved powers to assert state
legislative jurisdiction and control over federal lands." 2
It's unclear that the use of federal preemption will
serve as an acceptable solution to federal-state conflicts involving the use of federal lands. While still unsettled, the
law appears to be that, in areas held by the federal government's proprietary capacity, 14 host states may regulate
land use activities so long as the specific ambit of regulation
has not been preempted, using the same considerations for
preemption as discussed previously."'4
Thus, while the federal government is generally entitled
to perform its proprietary functions without conforming to
the police power regulations of a state,' the rule will not
140. White and Barry, supra note 1, quoting Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 C.S. 120, 132 (1945).
141. Bureau of Land Management, Department of Interior, Public Land Statistics table 7, at 10 (1974).
142. Senate Concurrent Resolution, 58th Sess., Legislature, State of Nevada
1975: Directing the Legislative Commission to Study the Various Possible
Means Whereby the Citizens of Nevada May Derive Greater Benefit from
the Public Lands Within the State Retained by the Federal Government;
and Act of June 4, 1979, ch. 633 § S(1) (Nevada) (commonly referred to
as A.B. 413); See also H. J. Res. No. 1, 40th Legislature of the State of
Utah (1974): Requesting the Federal Government to transfer ownership
to the Western states of all BLM lands within their borders and Act of
February 14, 1980, § 4(1) (Utah) (commonly referred to as S.B. 5); and
finally Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah's proposed Bill 1680, S1680, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess.
143. "Proprietary" capacity includes lands known as Article IV lands under
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3. This is distinguished from Article I lands which
are considered "legislative" in nature under U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, which
covers forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, and other medical buildings.
144. Landstrom, State and Local Government Regulation of Private Land Using
Activities or Federal Lands, NAT. RESOURCEs LAW 77, 78 (1974).
145. Arizona v. California, supra note 122, at 451.
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apply when Congress has expressly required federal compliance with state law,146 or where such compliance will not
frustrate federal policy.
Generally speaking when comparing federal and state
oil and gas conservation and environmental safeguards and
requirements for the public domain, the more stringent ones
apply."' State rules and regulations may be validly applied
because a federal administrative agency cannot make rules
and regulations for any and every purpose, but may only
promulgate directives that relate to matters clearly indicated and authorized by Congress.' 8 In fact, the Supreme
Court has gone so far as to state that "Where Congress does
not purport to override state power over public lands under
the Property Clause and where there has been no cession,
49
a federal official lacks power to regulate contrary to law.'
E. Cooperative Agreements
Even when the authority of one governmental body to
act in conflict with another is lacking or when federal supremacy and preemption over state and local actions could
legally occur, the political climate may require that the
various agencies attempt to provide a workable mechanism
for cooperation. However, two commentators have noted that,
"unlike legislation or regulation, a cooperative agreement
cannot alter applicable law." Consequently, "direct legal
conflicts will rarely be altered by a cooperative agreement."'
The benefit of knowing the contents of a particular
cooperative agreement, or whether one even exists, is to gain
146. EPA v. California and Alabama v. Seeber, supra note 123.
147. Texas Oil and Gas Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 277 F. Supp. 366 (W.D.
Okla. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 406 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 829 (1969).
148. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 522 (1911); In re Continental Oil
Co., 70 I.D. 475, 475 (1963).
149. Kleppe v. New Mexico, supra note 28, at 544 n.12, quoting Colorado v. Toll,
268 U.S. 228, 231 (1925), where it was held that the state was entitled to
prove that Congress had neither assumed exclusive legislative jurisdiction
by cession nor preemptive control under the Property Clause over highways
within the Rocky Mountain National Park. Despite the fact that the Court
was limiting its remarks in the Toll case, the statement still has general
applicability for all cases where Congress has not fully exercised its constitutional legislative jurisdiction and proprietary powers over public lands.
150. White and Barry; supra note 1, at 519.
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knowledge of the internal workings of the various party
agencies. If internal cooperation and communication becomes
strained, the agreement can be used as a starting point for
attempted repair. When no agreement exists, there is ample
precedent to suggest that the parties join together to clearly
decide any jurisdictional disputes.
One example of cooperative agreements is the previously
discussed 1945 correspondence between the Departments of
Interior and Agriculture concerning leasing on National
Forest System lands.' Another example of a cooperative
agreement is the one entered into in 1977 between the U.S.
Forest Service and the U.S. Geological Survey.'52 The purpose of this second joint agreement is to provide a means
by which the jurisdictional dividing line between the two
federal agencies may be clearly stated, including a mechanism for resolving jurisdictional disputes. The agreement
covers "areas of surface use" (ASU) within the national
forests wherein the Forest Service and the Geological Survey have joint management roles and responsibilities.
Only actual oil and gas operations are the responsibility
of the Geological Survey under the agreement, and other
activities are excluded and remain the primary jurisdiction
of the Forest Service. An ASU is defined generally as well
sites, tank batteries and gathering and other production
related lines. The benefit of. such an agreement is that it
provides allocation of responsibilities and determines what
each agency will do in preliminary environmental review
including NTL-6 procedures,' 53 in the processing of applications for a permit to conduct drilling operations, in complying with lease terms and conditions and emergency situations, in subsequent activities requiring a supplemental
surface use plan, in surface use management outside a
leasehold, in abandonment of approved plans of operation,
and in the general coordination and communication between
the two agencies.
151. See note 67 supra.
152. See note 92 supra.
153. Notice to Lessees No. 6, 41 Fed. Reg. 18116, (April 30, 1976)..
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F. Statutory
While there is no doubt that many of the intergovernmental conflicts discussed in this paper could be solved by
appropriate federal legislation, the probability of its occurring seems unlikely at the present. One need only examine
federal legislation and withdrawals affecting Alaskan lands
for a good barometer of statutory success in resolving federalstate conflicts.
Few will deny that ambiguity and overlapping jurisdiction exists between federal agencies and that residents of
public land states have a legitimate concern that federallyowned lands be developed and managed in a manner that
will be consistent with and serve the interests of the national
and local populations. Unfortunately, the states with the
largest proportion of public lands have the smallest representation in Congress. Non-Western states, with only 6.5
percent of public lands within their borders, currently enjoy
84 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives. The
12 Western states, which contain 93.5 percent of federallyowned lands, are represented by only 17 percent of the
membership of the House.'
Nevertheless, statutory solutions are possible provided
a compelling argument and sufficient congressional support
can be marshalled to the cause. It will be interesting to
note the success or failure of Senator Orrin Hatch's S.1680
(Sagebrush Rebellion) Bill and other similar legislation.
Certainly, at the federal level, the passage of FLPMA went
light years ahead of the ambiguous and conflicting morass
that was created by the 3,000 different acts which preceded
it in governing the BLM.
G. Resolution of Conflicts by Regulation
Regulations are authorized whenever Congress has provided the necessary statutory power to an agency. Certainly
in the case of the BLM, much could be done in the way of
federal-state cooperation. through the administrative reg154. U.S. Dept of Comm., Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
(1975).
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ulatory process. For example, FLPMA contains numerous
requirements for coordination of federal resource management plans and programs with state and local land-use
plans.155 It provides new opportunities for state and local
governments to acquire federal lands needed for public purposes, frequently at little or no cost.15 FLPMA also directs
the BLM to cooperate with local law enforcement personnel
and to pay for their services. 1"7 The law also calls for establishment of right-of-way corridors on federal lands which
must consider state land use policies.'
Even though the National Forest Management Act of
1976111 was originally designed primarily to establish guidelines for timber harvesting of national forests, it also contains several provisions under which regulations could be
drafted to avoid federal-state conflicts. 6 °
H. State Agency Assistance
When a private industry development is caught between
a federal-state intergovernmental conflict, one of the best
solutions is to turn to a sympathetic state agency for assistance. For example, under the Forest Service's RARE II
inventory for Utah, the Utah State Energy Office actively
solicited industry input into its own planning process and
for its RARE II responses. While certainly not the only
factor, the input of the state of Utah in the RARE II program had a significant impact on the limited amount of
Utah federal lands recommended for wilderness or further
planning as compared to its sister states of Idaho and Wyoming. 161
Recommendations 13, 14 and 15 of the Public Land Law
Review Commission (PLLRC) specifically stated that (1)
155. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712(c) (9), 1712(f), 1720, 1721(c)

(1976).

156. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1713, 1721 (1976).
157. 43 U.S.C. § 1733(c) (1) (1976).
158. 43 U.S.C. § 1763 (1976).
159. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1976).
160. E.g. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (1976).
161. The Forest Service under RARE II recommended only approximately 10
percent of Utah National Forest lands for wilderness designation and
recommended 33 percent and 30 percent respectively for Idaho and Wyoming. Source: Forest Service Final Environmental Impact Statement on
RARE II.
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state and local governments should have an effective role
in federal land planning; (2) the states should get federal
funds to help them plan better; and (3) federal-state regional land use planning commissions should be established
where possible.'
The various state energy and planning
agencies seem eager to step in to assist and require only
the necessary data and arguments to begin working on behalf of the industry. To a large degree, the PLLRC's recommendations were incorporated in FLPMA Section 202(c)
(9), which mandates the Secretary of Interior to coordinate
his efforts with state land managers and to consider state
land resource management programs. As previously mentioned, however, this duty seems to be expressly contingent
upon a state actually having its own land-use plan or planning process. The Secretary's obligation will not be binding
in states where no land-use program or planning process
exists.
In those instances where a state has a land-use plan,
the Secretary of Interior is obligated under Section 202 of
FLPMA to inform himself of its existence to the extent he
finds practical. Thus, the solution to many oil and gas
problems may be solved by adhering to the state land-use
plan and by requesting the state to be the arbiter on industry's behalf.
I. Litigation Solutions
Both RMOGA v. Andrus' and Mountain States Legal
Foundations v. Andrus' point to the effectiveness of turning to the courts to obtain relief from recalcitrant government bodies. The Mountain States case and the RMOGA case
(if it is upheld on appeal), will be significant steps forward
in opening large areas of the Overthrust Belt to reasonable
and environmentally acceptable access, drilling and development. Certainly access across federal public lands to reach
162.

ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND,

Report of the Public Land Law Review

Commission (June, 1970).
163. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Andrus, upra note 75.

164. Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, supra note 61.
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state school trust fund lands would not have occurred without the clarification of law obtained from the courts.
The drawback of resorting to litigation before attempting other avenues of relief is that a court case can be dragged
on for extended periods of time. Such delays may have a
substantial adverse effect when one considers that almost
all modern oil and gas leases have limited terms of duration. A party may win the court battle over governmental
jurisdiction but through delay still lose its investment and
drilling opportunities under the lease.
Furthermore, litigation, while costly in terms of money
and effort, often will only serve to solve jurisdictional problems on a case-by-case basis. Even then, until the highest
tribunal has spoken the final result is not known.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Being caught between governmental entities with conflicting and overlapping land or mineral development jurisdiction is bound to give a feeling of helplessness. Too many
instances occur even to mention each example of such intergovernmental conflict in mineral development. However, by
reducing the problem to its simplest terms, one can best
decide where the problem lies. It is hoped this paper will
provide a starting point for such analysis.
Whether one, all, or any of the described solutions
should be attempted will depend upon a particular case. In
addition, a decision must be made as to how to tackle the
problem, either as an individual company or through an
industry association or other agencies of government.
Finally, both government and industry leaders must
think carefully about utilizing joint federal-state comprehensive land-use planning. Only by such a mechanism can
we achieve a truly coordinated and effective land-use policy
to meet our country's energy needs.
Although it may be. too early to tell whether Secretary
of the Interior Watt will succeed in his attempts to solve
some of the intergovernmental conflicts which are impeding
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/2
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a progressive domestic energy development program,' there
is a ray of hope that an effective dialogue between the
various levels of government has increased the probability
that a constructive level of federal-state cooperation may be
obtained.

165. Various environmental groups have been circulating petitions in an attempt
to obtain over a million signatures of people requesting that Secretary
Watt be removed from office.
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